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ABSTRACT
This paper tries to provide a simple explanation for the empirical finding,
documented here and also by Hau, Killeen and Moore (2002), that spreads in
the spot USD/EUR market are substantially higher than those in the preceding
DEM/USD foreign exchange market. The paper argues that it is primarily the
re-factoring of the exchange rate, 1.75 DEM per USD compared to 1 USD per
EUR together with the fact that dealers are faced with a minimum tick size,
that has caused spreads to increase (as a percentage of mid-quote).
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1. Introduction
At the creation of the euro on 1st January 1999, it was suggested that the new
European currency might challenge the dollar in its position as the world/vehicle
currency. The dominance of the dollar is shown by the huge share that it takes in
global daily foreign exchange (FX) turnover. In April 2001 the US dollar was on one
side of 90.4% of all currency trades.1 In an international setting, market participants
will, more often than not, choose the transactions medium with the lowest costs.
The subsequent accumulation of trades will cause these costs to fall still further by
economies of scale: the fixed order processing costs of market makers will be spread
across larger volume. This virtuous cycle implies the existence of multiple equilibria
(the dominance of any of a number of currencies in financial markets) and can result
in inertia of the current equilibrium, i.e. the currency with hegemonic status will be
maintained as the international/vehicle currency. For a greater discussion of these
issues see Hartmann (1998a). It has been argued that the world’s financial markets
could shift from one equilibrium to another only if a large enough shock occurs
(Portes and Rey 1998) and the arrival of the euro has thus been suggested to be
the required impetus that might break the dollar’s hegemonic status. But how has
the euro performed since its birth in its role as a possible international transaction
medium? One approach to answering this is to consider the costs that FX market
participants face when trading euros. If the costs of trading in the euro markets have
fallen compared to those seen for the euro’s ‘predecessor’, the deutsche mark, then
one can argue that the euro is more liquid than the DM and stands a better chance
of breaking the hegemony of the dollar.
It is for this reason that we consider the costs of trading euros in the foreign exchange
markets. More specifically we consider the spread, the difference between the price at
which one buys and sells the currency.2 We compare the spread between the euro and
1BIS press release 9th October 2001. This is a slight increase from the corresponding figure for
April 1998, which was 87.3%.
2However we accept that in order to make a more complete assessment of the euro’s role, we
should consider other financial markets such as debt instruments and other securities.
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the dollar to the spread between the deutsche mark (the previous dominant European
currency) and the dollar. However, our paper goes beyond simply analysing the cost
of trading euros and looks more closely at the structural/institutional factors that
underlie spread determination; namely, price grids and the granularity of markets.
Hau, Killeen, and Moore (2002), from here on referred to as HKM, examine spreads
for a number of currencies from January 1998 to August 1999, i.e. twelve months
prior to the euro’s introduction and eight months post euro introduction, finding that
the DM/$ to $/euro spreads increased from 3.76 basis points to 5.26 basis points,
an increase of 40%. They also find that Yen/DM-euro and £/DM-euro spreads
increased over the same period and offer a microstructure approach explanation;
namely the market transparency hypothesis. This suggests that after the currency
unification, imbalances and desired trading positions of market makers became more
easily identifiable by other market participants. Therefore larger spreads are quoted
by FX dealers to compensate for this increased risk.
In this paper we offer evidence on how bid-ask spreads, as well as other relevant statis-
tics (number of trades, volatility, etc.), have changed since the introduction of the
euro. We find that spreads on Reuters D2000-2 (an electronic broking system), when
defined as a percentage of mid-quote, have increased significantly from the DM/$ to
the $/euro era, consistent with HKM. However we also offer a different explanation
for this increase, which is somewhat simpler than the market transparency hypoth-
esis. We suggest that the spreads in both the DM/$ and $/euro periods are set by
market makers as a number of pips, the absolute difference between the bid and ask
prices, and not as a percentage of mid-quote. For example a market maker may buy
euros at an exchange rate, bid price, of 0.8900 dollars per euro and sell euros at an
ask price of 0.8902 dollars per euro. This implies a spread of 2 pips. We find that
this pip spread has not changed significantly between the two exchange rate periods
and it is purely the definition of the exchange rate that has caused the spread (as a
percentage of mid-quote) to increase for the $/euro. 1 pip as a percentage of 0.8901
($/euro mid-quote) is obviously greater than 1 pip as a percentage of 1.7530 (DM/$
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mid-quote). Note that the pip defines the minimum bid-ask spread.
Thus, if we were to assume a degree of dealer competition in the DM/$ market that
led to a fair number of observations of spreads at their minimum level, one would
quite naturally expect observed percentage spreads in the subsequent $/euro market
to be higher. Dealers would be prevented from competing spreads down to their
prior magnitudes (in percentage terms) simply due to the granularity of the pricing
system.
There is an existing literature that studies changes in effective pip/tick sizes, fo-
cussing mainly on regulatory changes to the nominal minimum price variation in
North American equity markets. In June 1997, both the NYSE and the NASDAQ
stock market lowered the nominal minimum price variation from one eighth to one
sixteenth of a dollar. By the end of January 2001, the minimum price variation had
been further lowered for all NYSE issues to one cent. Thus the US experience is one of
reductions in the (percentage) tick size. The evidence from these reductions is fairly
consistent. Subsequent to the changes, quoted (and effective) spreads declined, as
did quoted depths. See, for examples, Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000) and Jones and
Lipson (2001) for evidence on the 1997 reforms and Bacidore, Battalio, Jennings, and
Farkas (2001) for evidence on the effects of the NYSE decimalization. Harris (1999)
provides a survey of the debate surrounding the implementation of decimalization.
Thus the US evidence suggests that larger tick sizes maintain larger costs of trade,
at least for those individuals for whom bid-ask spreads are the relevant measure
of transactions costs. In the situation under study in the current paper, we see
effective tick sizes increasing in the transition from DM/$ to $/euro. Reference to
the US equity markets literature then raises the possibility of a resultant increase in
percentage spreads/costs of trade.
The increase in percentage spreads is discomforting not only because of the higher
transactions costs but also because of something which is not as easy to observe;
liquidity.3 The higher spreads may be an equilibrium response to increased difficulties
3As reported in the BIS 71st annual report, evidence on how liquidity has changed, when proxied
3
in inventory control due to lower liquidity, making risk management more difficult.
However, it could well be the case that spreads are relatively tighter in the $/euro
market than in the DM/$ market for larger trade sizes. These large volumes have
tended to move from direct inter-dealer to electronically brokered trading, such as
Reuters D2000-2 and EBS, since it is possible to hide your true position and trade
size on these systems.4
Our analysis makes use of a unique dataset that allows us to analyse real time
firm/tradable spreads. The data, taken from the Reuters D2000-2 broking system,
shows the quoted prices and spreads at which trades actually occur, rather than in-
dicative spreads which have often been used in previous analysis, including Hartmann
(1999) and Hartmann (1998b) and also that of HKM. Indicative quotes are just that;
they give an indication of the prices in the market and hence are less accurate, with
the spreads tending to be larger than actual spreads. Tradable spreads show more
precisely the cost of transactions for the agents participating in the market and the
cost of providing liquidity for the specialist dealers. Using this dataset, we should
be able to give a much more accurate impression of how the cost of trading/spreads
have changed.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the data
and presents summary statistics for the two periods. Section 3 explains our spread
determination exercise, presents our regression results and includes a more detailed
comparison of the spreads after taking into consideration the different market condi-
tions in the two samples. A discussion of our findings is given in section 4 along with
policy implications and section 5 concludes.
by volumes, spreads and volatility, is inconclusive. Bid-ask spreads and short-term volatilities in the
$/euro market in 2000 were broadly similar to those present in 1998. However the BIS also report
that foreign exchange market activity declined substantially between 1998 and 2001. Daily average
spot transactions for April fell from US$568 billion in 1998 to US$387 billion in 2001. This is also
consistent with Goldman-Sachs (2000), which shows that monthly spot foreign exchange turnover
through EBS (Electronic Broking Services) between the dollar and the dominant European currency
was lower in 1999 than 1998, i.e. lower for the $/euro than the DM/$. BIS suggests that the decrease
in volume is due to the loss of trading in former EMS currencies and the widespread adoption of
electronic brokers.
4From the BIS 71st annual report, between 85% and 95% of inter-bank trading took place using
electronic broking in 2000 compared to only 50% in 1998.
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2. Data and analysis
The data used were for the dollar/euro ($ per euro) exchange rate from 28th Septem-
ber 1999 to 8th March 2000, obtained from Reuters D2000-2 via the Bank of England,
and the deutsche-mark/dollar (DM per $) exchange rate for the five days from 6th to
10th October 1997, obtained directly from Reuters. For this analysis, two datasets
were used for both DM/$ and $/euro periods. The first contained data including the
date, time (hour and minute) together with the best bid and ask prices. The second
contained data on trade flows, also including the date, time (hour and minute), the
direction of the trade (buyer initiated or seller initiated) and the price at which the
transaction occurred. From the first dataset the mid-quote (mq) of the bid and ask
prices was calculated as:
mq =
bid+ ask
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(1)
and the spread (s) was calculated as a percentage of this mid-quote.
s =
100 ∗ (ask − bid)
mq
(2)
The spread as a number of pips (pip) was calculated as:
pip = 10000 ∗ (ask − bid) (3)
This was done for every datum observation over the entire period and, since a zero
bid or ask suggests erroneous data, all observations with these characteristics were
removed. Non-positive spreads were also removed, primarily because they represent
the matching of market orders on the Reuters D2000-2 system.
The aim of the exercise was to calculate the average spread over each day and over
each hour. However since any analysis would be distorted if data over the entire
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period were used, due to the large spreads late at night and early in the morning when
trading activity is thin, it was decided that only data during periods of significant
trading would be considered. To determine which hours of the day should be used,
the average numbers of trades per hour were calculated for both datasets. For the
$/euro, 97.5% of all trades took place in the ten hours between 0700 and 1700 London
time and for the DM/$, 95.3% of all trades took place between 0600 and 1600 GMT.
The apparent one hour delay for the $/euro data comes from the fact that these
data were already adjusted for daylight saving time pre 31st October 1999, whilst
the DM/$ data were not. It was then decided that only these ten-hour periods of
each day would be considered when analysing the spreads.
When calculating the spreads over each hour and each day for both the percentage of
mid-quote and in pips, two definitions were used. The first was the arithmetic mean of
the spreads and the second weighted each spread by how long it lasted in the market.
As well as these spread measures, total trades, absolute imbalance, return volatility
and the standard deviation of spreads, were also calculated for each hour (day). To
calculate return volatility each hour (day) was split into five-minute intervals. The
percentage change between the first calculated mid-quotes in each interval was defined
as the return (r) from one interval to the next and return volatility (VOLAT) was
defined as the sum of the square of the returns:
V OLAT =
T∑
t=1
(rt)
2 (4)
Where T =12 for hourly volatility and 120 for daily volatility.5 Total trades is
defined as the number of times a transaction (buy or sell) occurred in the hour (day).
Unfortunately we were not given the information on the size of the trades or market
depth but only the number of trades. Absolute imbalance is simply defined as the
absolute difference between the number of market buys (buyer initiated trades) and
the number of market sells (seller initiated trades) in each time period.
5For this definition of volatility see Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Labys (2001).
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